This paper presents a general approach for analysis and verification of authentication properties in the language of Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP). It is illustrated by an examination of the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol. The contribution of this paper is to develop a specific theory appropriate to the analysis of authentication protocols, built on top of the general CSP semantic framework. This approach aims to combine the ability to express such protocols in a natural and precise WQY with the facility to reason formally about the properties they exhibit.
Introduction
Authentication comes in a number of flavours. For example, Gollmann [6] has identified four different varieties of authentication, which raises the question for any particular authentication protocol as to which kind of authentication the protocol was designed for, and which kinds it actually provides.
The aim of the CSP approach is to reduce questions about security protocols and properties to questions concerning whether CSP processes satisfy particular CSP specifications. This approach forces the separation of properties and protocols, and allows discussion of what is meant by particular kinds of security property independently of the protocols that are intended to achieve them. The formal analysis will then be entirely within the CSP framework which allows the possibility of verification of protocols with respect to the CSP properties.
Tlhe general CSP framework proposed by this author has been described in [20] . That paper is concerned with the theoretical foundations. It offers definitions of security properties, including authentication. This means that since a CSP description of a protocol has a precisely defined semantics it is a precise mathematical question as to whether the protocol meets the property or not. However, the practicalities of how such a verification might be carried out were not addressed; that is the purpose of this paper.
The approach taken here is firstly to express the protocol in CSP. The authentication property we consider states that if some events R in the system are restricted, then other events T should not occur. We establish this by defining a suitable predicate on messages which shows that only particular messages can circulate in the restricted system, and hence that messages from T are not possible.
CSP is particularly suitable for describing protocols close to the level we think of them. In other contexts the argument for authentication essentially amounts to an unreachability analysis or a proof that a particular word is not in a language. The strength of this approach is that there is a formal link between the argument and a natural description of the protocol. Formalisation of the protocol into CSP also exposes issues and forces design decisions that may not have been explicit in the original abstract protocol description. The formalisation of the required authentication property likewise forces consideration of what, precisely, is meant by authentication. It is useful to know which precise (CSP) properties the protocol does indeed guarantee, and which it does not.
One of the strengths of CSP is the ease with which specialised theories can be constructed on top of the semantic models. This allows particular specification statements to be defined in terms of the standard semantics, and new proof rules appropriate to these specifications to be provided. This approach is taken here, where we specify and reason about authentication properties, and also about agents' inability to generate particular messages. Although standard proof rules would support the verification (since they are sound and complete), it is preferable to develop a specialised theory since it provides an appropriate level of abstraction for supporting the kind of reasoning we require. For reasons of space, this paper will not present details of the CSP proof system and CSP algebraic identities which underpin the results. They are given in a fuller version [all of this paper.
The Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol
The Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol aims to achieve authentication of each of its participants to the other. It makes use of public key cryptography, where each participant has a public key which is available to everybody, and a private key known to no-one else. Any message encrypted with a public key requires the corresponding secret key in order to decrypt it.
The original version of the protocol E151 assumed that the participants did not know each other's public key, and so each engaged in a message exchange with a trusted server in order to obtain it. If the participants do begin by knowing the public keys, then the protocol may be distilled to three messages (as described in [9]) as below. We will refer to it in this paper as NS1.
A + B
: pB(7ZA.A)
A + B : P B (~E )
B + A : PA(nA.ng)
The participants of the protocol are A and B , their public keys are P A and p~ respectively, and each generates one nonce, nA and ng respectively.
An informal explanation of the design of the protocol might run as follows: A sends a nonce nA to B , encrypted with B's public key. When A later receives a message containing the nonce nA, she knows that B must have generated it, since only B could decrypt the first message and thus obtain the nonce nA, so B's identity is authenticated to A . Similarly, B sent out a nonce encrypted with A's public key, so the final message received by B , containing the nonce ng , must have been generated by A because only A could have decrypted the message that B sent out. Thus A is authenticated to B , and the two participants know that they are talking to each other.
In [9], Lowe describes an unexpected execution of the protocol, discovered using model-checking techniques on a CSP description of a network running the protocol. In this run, B receives 'authentication' that he is talking to A , but A is in fact talking to an intruder I , who she believes to be honest. The execution is described as follows, where I ( A ) denotes the intruder I masquerading as A (in other words, generating messages which appear to have been sent from A , and intercepting messages destined for A ) .
B's response to the nonce challenge is to A , but there is nothing in that message to indicate that the response indeed originated from B. The intruder I is therefore able to pass it off as a nonce challenge that I has issued, and so I receives the response from A , which is then passed to B .
Authentication normally requires that each agent must at least assume that the other is honest, and will correctly follow the steps of the protocol. Note that in this attack A is indeed acting honestly, though her judgement concerning I's honesty is questionable.
Lowe's fix
Lowe observed that the above sequence of messages can be prevented by including the identity of the responder in the second message to identify its originator, and ensuring that this is checked. The resulting protocol is described below. We will refer to it in this paper as NS2. Lowe observed that the model-checking techniques used to find the earlier flaw found no flaw with this protocol. Furthermore, he offered a proof that any attack on the protocol as a whole would also be an attack on the necessarily finite CSP description that had been model-checked. Since no such attack had been found, there could be no attack on the protocol. The proof considered the nature of any possible sequence of messages embodying an attack.
A + B
This paper aims at a more direct method of verification, in which a CSP description of the protocol in a hostile environment is shown to meet particular authentication properties. The proof provides insight into why the design of the protocol is correct.
The protocol NS2 is used as an example running through the paper. For the purposes of illustrating the approach, we first consider a single run of the protocol where both participants know their roles in advance; having worked through the approach with this example, we w i l l finally show how the approach generalises to multiple, interleaved runs of the protocol between many different agents.
Section 3 introduces the aspects of the language and theory of Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) appropriate to this paper. Section 4 constructs a CSP model for analysing authentication protocols, and describes NS2 in CSP. Section 5 introduces the CSP approach to defining authentication properties, and considers the properties that might be required of NS2. Section 6 describes a theory for verifying authentication protocols against particular authentication requirements. Section 7 carries out the verification for NS2. Section 8 discusses the generalisation of the analysis to consider the case of multiple, concurrent runs of the protocol. Section 9 briefly discusses how the algebraic properties of cryptomechanisms might be incorporated within the analysis. We end with a discussion in Section 10.
CSP
CSP is an abstract language designed specifically for the description of communication patterns of concurrent system components that interact through message passing. It is underpinned by a theory which supports analysis of systems described in CSP. It is therefore well suited to the description and analysis of network protocols: protocols can be described within CSP, as can the relevant aspects of the network. Their interactions can be investigated, and certain aspects of their behaviour can be verified through use of the theory. This section introduces the notation and ideas used in this paper. In particular, only the traces model for CSP is used here. For a fuller introduction to the language the reader is referred to [7] .
Events
Systems are modelled in terms of the events that they can perform. The set of all possible events (fixed at the beginning of the analysis) is denoted C. Events may be atomic in structure or may consist of a number of distinct components. For example, an event put.5 consists of two parts: a channel name put, and a data value 5. An example of events used in this paper are 
Processes
Processes are the components of systems. They are the entities that are described using CSP, and they are described in terms of the possible events that they may engage in. The process Stop is the process that can engage in no events at all; it is equivalent to deadlock.
The output c!v -+ P is able initially to perform only c.v, the output of v on channel c, after which it behaves as P. The input c?x : T + P ( z ) can accept any input x of type T along channel c , following which it behaves as P ( x ) . Its first event will be any event of the form c.t where t E T . The process P 17 Q (pronounced 'P choice Q') can behave either as P or as Q: its possible communications are those of P and those of Q. An indexed form of choice aiEI Pi is able to behave as any of its arguments Pi.
Processes may also be composed in parallel. If D is a set of events then the process P I[ D]\ Q behaves as P and Q acting concurrently, with the requirement that they have to synchronise on any event in the synchronisation set D ; events not in D may be performed by either process independently of the other. A special form of parallel operator in which the two components do not interact on any events is P 111 Q which is equivProcesses may be recursively defined by means of equational definitions. Process names must appear on the left hand side of such definitions, and CSP expressions which may include those names appear on the right hand side. For example, the definition alent to P 1[011 Q. LIGHT = on + off + LIGHT defines a process LIGHT whose only possible behaviour is to perform on and off alternately.
Mutually recursive processes may also be defined, where a (possibly infinite) collection of process names X ( k ) appear on the left hand side of definitions, and CSP expressions F ( k ) involving any of those names appear on the right. For example, the set of definitions
define a collection of processes; COUNT(0) can do any number of up and down events, but can never do more downs than ups.
For a full discussion of single and mutually recursive process definitions, see [3].
Traces
The semantics of a process P is defined to be the set of sequences of events (traces(P)) that it may possibly perform. Examples of traces include () (the empty trace, which is possible for any process) and (on, off, on) which is a possible trace of LIGHT. The traces model for CSP [7] gives a formal definition of the set of traces associated with each CSP process. Every process is associated with some non-empty prejix-closed set of traces: if t q A tr2 is a possible trace, then so is If tr is a sequence, then u ( t r ) is the set of events a p pearing in the sequence. The operator U extends to processes: u ( P ) is the set of events that appear in some trace of P.
Specification
Specifications are given as predicates on traees, and a process P satisfies a specification S if all of its traces satisfy S:
V tr E traces(P).S For example, the specification which states that event a must occur before event b might be captured with the predicate
The fact that traces(P) is always prefix-closed allows a simpler specification:
This states that if b occurs somewhere in the trace, then so does a. Since a process satisfying this specification must have all of its traces meeting the predicate, this means that a must occur before b, since if b occurred first in some trace tr then a prefix of tr containing b but not a would fail to meet the predicate.
The CSP model
The approach taken to modelling and analysing security protocols is to provide a CSP description of the Dolev-Yao model [5]. Here it is assumed that the communications medium is entirely under the control of the enemy, which can block, re-address, duplicate, and fake messages. We will define a 'generates' relation twhich describes when new messages may be derived from existing ones: S t m means that knowledge of all the messages in S is sufficient to produce m. This will be used to capture the enemy's ability to fake messages. In [20] the roles of the passive medium and of the active enemy were described using distinct CSP processes which enabled the capabilities of the enemy to be separately described. For the purposes of this paper it is preferable to describe the combination of the enemy and the medium as a single CSP process ENEMY, since this makes for an easier analysis.
There is a set USER consisting of the names of all the agents which use the network. For each i E USER we associate a process USERi which describes how user i behaves. Each process USERi communicates with ENEMY by means of a channel trans.i on which it transmits messages, and a channel rec.i on which it receives messages. Thus we have U ( USERi) trans.iU rec.i.
The resulting network is then described as follows:
This network is pictured in Figure 1 .
In the analysis of a protocol we might consider A and B as the two parties involved in the protocol, and USERA and USERB will describe the respective roles that they Play. If there are actually no other users connected to the system, then we can have USERi = Stop for each i # A , B and we obtain
We retain the names of other users in the set USER to retain the potential of the ENEMY to masquerade as a different user. A message trans.i.j.m should be thought of as node i sending a message m with destination j . Thus i is the source, j the destination, and m the message. The message space MESSAGE will generally be defined as an abstract daka type.
Message space
The message space we use for analysis of this protocol is as follows:
In fact for this example using public key cryptography, the space KEY will split into public keys PUBLIC and secret keys SECRET, one of each for each user in USER:
We have rules concerning the way messages may be generated from existing ones. This set of rules defines the generates relation t.
Description of ENEMY
A natural CSP description of the Dolev-Yao model separates out an essentially passive medium MEDIUM from an intruder INTRUDER which is able to read messages from the medium (via channel leak) and to manipulate it by removing and adding messages (via channels kill and add). This approach was taken in [20] , and allows explicit modeling of the enemy actions. However, for verification purposes an equivalent description will be easier to use in proofs:
This process has exactly the same traces as the combination of MEDIUM and INTRUDER. It reads all messages output by any of the users on any of the channels trans, and it can pass on any message which it can generate to any user (which allows for honest message passing, redirecting messages, replaying messages, and inventing new messages). Furthermore, since all of these options are possibilities rather than imperatives, it is also possible that messages will be blocked simply by the enemy not exercising the option of passing them on.
The set S contains messages which the enemy knows about: every time a new message is put out by some user, the set S is augmented. There will be a set INIT consisting of the enemy's initial knowledge: this may contain items such as users' names, public keys, and some nonces which the enemy may use.
ENEMY = ENEMY ( I N I T )
The agents implementing the protocols place restrictions on the messages that may be passed on trans, which in turn restricts the possibilities for messages being passed on rec.
We are already in a position to prove that all messages passed on rec must be generable from the initial set INIT together with the messages input on trans:
Protocol participants
The agents A and B that are the participants in the protocol are modelled as USERA and USERB , consisting of CSP implementations of the two halves of the protocol. Obviously these will vary depending on the protocol being modelled. More generally, if there are other participants (such as trusted third parties) then their activity will also be described as CSP processes.
For the purposes of illustrating the CSP approach, we simplify the analysis by considering up to Section 8 only the case where A is the initiator (and knows that she is), and B is the responder (and knows that he is). This description therefore does not allow for attacks where both parties act as initiators, or as senders. This assumption will be relaxed in Section 8, where each party can independently play either role. indicates that the process will only accept an input which is encrypted by P A , whose first nonce is n A , and whose included user identity is i; but that x can be any nonce. The use of pattern matching on message input corresponds to the assumption that any message that fails to match the pattern would be ignored, though we are modelling this as blocking receipt rather than accepting and throwing it away: the USERi processes simply do not engage in any message which does not match the pattern. In practice, this is unlikely to be achievable, especially in cases where an agent must decrypt a message before finding out if it is of a particular form. However, it does not affect the ability of the enemy to attack protocols described in this way.
Typing of messages is also implicit in pattern matching. 
pg(ng) -+ Stop
The first message rec.B?j?pB(y.j) allows input of any message along B's receive channel which is encrypted with B's secret key. The apparent source j should match the source j given in the message; and y can be any nonce. Pattern matching is used again here.
The second message trans.B!j!pj(y.nB.B) describes B's response to the first message. The required response is the nonce y together with B's nonce challenge ng, and B's name B , all encrypted with the public key of the originator of the first message.
Finally, the third message that is expected is a response with apparent source j to the nonce challenge ng. The only possibility is p~( n g ) , so all other inputs will be blocked/ignored.
Authentication properties
A message-oriented approach to authentication is discussed in [20] . Authentication considers a set of messages T to authenticate another set of messages R if occurrence of some element of T must have been accompanied in P by occurrence of some element of R.
The sets T and R are taken to be disjoint. The trace specification may be captured as follows Definition 5.1 
Flavours of origin a u t h e n t i c a t i o n p r o p e r t y
The treatment of authentication in terms of sets of messages allows for extremely fine-grained distinctions to be made between different flavours of authentication property.
Even if we restrict the authenticating message to be USERB'S last one rec.B.A.pB(nB), then there are a number of possibilities as to what this message might authenticate:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
Authenticating "trans.A.B.pB(nA .A)" corresponds to the requirement that occurrence of B's final message guarantees that A initiated the protocol run with B , with the nonce nA.
Authenticating " t r a n s . A . B . p~( N0NCE.A)" corresponds to the requirement that on occurrence of B's last message it is guaranteed that A initiated the protocol run with B , but possibly with a different nonce. Lemma 5.3 yields that this is implied by property (1). Property 6 is one of the strongest properties, and is the one that is most appropriate to prove for user B : that if he reaches the end of the protocol, then A also reached the end of the protocol, and responded to the nonce challenge nB, and believed she was talking to B . The original protocol NS1 fails to meet this property, though it does meet the weaker Property 8 (a proof is provided in [21]).
Verification
We obtain an extremely specialised theorem that applies to authentication properties on this specific description NET of the network. This theorem is at the heart of the proof strategy presented in this paper. It provides a sufficient list of conditions whose achievement guarantees that NET sat T authenticates R . The predicate I is intended to hold of all messages which can be generated by some agent (including the enemy) during a run of the protocol, when all messages in the set R are prevented from occurring. The intention is to show that this restriction on R means that no event from T can occur. Conditions C1 and C2 together mean that if the enemy only ever sees messages which satisfy I , then he can only ever generate messages which satisfy I .
Condition C4 states that the same is true for the users of the network (when restricted on R ) : they never output a message that does not satisfy I unless they previously received such a message. The specification maintains I is defined as:
If every message received on Tec meets I, then every message sent out on trans also meets I .
The predicate I can therefore be seen as describing an invariant: at every stage of the protocol's execution when R is restricted, I must hold of the next message.
Since C3 states that I does not hold for any message in T, this means that no message in T can ever be generated if R is restricted, which in turn means that T authenticates R by Lemma 5.1.
The problem for any particular protocol, and a particular authentication property expressed in terms of R and T, is to find an appropriate invariant I which makes C1 to C4 all true.
Rank functions
A previous approach [21] introduced a rank function p on messages which captured their level of encryption. Only messages of positive rank were to circulate in the system. In this setting, the invariant I ( m ) was taken to be p(m) > 0. The rank function was used to define the invariant I below, but Theorem 6.1 is here presented in terms of I rather than p in order to provide a sharper description of the role played by the predicate. In many cases it may well be easier to define I in terms of a rank function, though this requires further investigation.
Verification of Property 6
The authentication property 6 states that An appropriate predicate for verification of NS2 with respect to this property is the following. It is dependent on the descriptions USERA and USERB, and on the property to be verified.
It has been defined by structural induction on the definition of the message space.
We must show that C1-C4 of Theorem 6.1 are satisfied by this invariant, in order for the theorem to be applicable.
C1
The condition C1 really amounts to an assumption on the initial information available to the enemy. 
NONCE.~B.B, or I ( n~. c . i ) .
This disjunction implies that either z = n B and i = b, or else I(z). In the first case, the restricted USERA sends out no further messages, so cannot violate the requirement. In the second case, the restricted user sends out p i ( z ) , and since I(z), it follows that I ( p i ( z ) ) , so again the requirement is not violated. This completes the proof.
We now turn our attention to USERB. P B ( n B ) * Since l l ( n B ) , it from the definition Of The restricting event t~ans.A.B.pB(nB) does not inter-
I that i I ( p~( n g ) ) .
sect with the events that USERB performs, so USERB itself is the process to consider to establish C4 for B. 
There are proof rules for CSP (presented in [21] ) which allow a formal proof that this process satisfies mai.ntains I. Here we will present an informal argumeint, by considering the messages that RUSERA sends and receives. We must prove that if every message received by the process meets the predicate I, then every message sent out by it also does so. We proceed by establishing that no message sent out by RUSERA violates this requirement.
The first message that is sent out is p i ( n~. A ) for some i. ' The definition of I yields that I ( p i ( n~. A ) ) , so the first message sent out by RUSERA does not violate our requirement .
we have only to consider the case where I ( p~( y . j ) ) .
The definition of I yields that I ( y ) .
The second message is a transmission of p~ ( y . n~. B ) where y is the nonce received in the first message. The reasoning above for USE&,, has already established that this holds for the case where j = a . 
Multiple runs
All the analysis performed above has been on a system where there is but a single run of the protocol between A and B , and where A and B take the roles of initiator and responder respectively. While it is possible informally to generalise the verifications to systems with repeated runs of the protocol, it is also possible to describe in CSP the situation where agents perform multiple runs of the protocol and hence provide a formal verification. Analysis of a single run allows attention to be focussed on the two participants of the run. In the case where we have multiple runs, it is appropriate to model the two parties as able to engage in their other runs with any other parties, and restrict their behaviour only for the protocol run under analysis. This is the approach that we shall take.
One issue to be addressed concerns the requirement to use a fresh nonce on every protocol run. This may be modelled in CSP by using an infinite sequence of nonces where nA,k and ng,k are used on the kth run of A and B respectively. The kth run of the protocol will be defined in terms of what occurs during that run, and when the k + l t h run can commence.
The most general situation allows an agent to take the role of initiator or of responder independently in each run. These possibilities are captured in the description of a user by allowing the 1 + l t h run to begin at any point after the start of the lth run. In particular, USERi(1) describes user i at the point where the lth run of the protocol is ready to be executed. As soon as it begins, the description enables the 1 + l t h run to execute concurrently with run 1 (and any earlier runs which are still proceeding).
The processes US ERA(^) are described as follows: The possibilities for USERA ( k ) are as follows:
1. to transmit a message of the form trans.A.i.p,(nA,k . A ) corresponding to USERA initiating a run of the protocol. The behaviour subsequent to this message is the rest of the messages appropriate t o the protocol run, together
2.
with the possibilities of US ERA(^ + 1 ) that the next protocol run will begin.
to receive a message of the form rec.A.j.pA(y.j), purporting to be a message from j initiating a protocol run with A . The subsequent behaviour is to continue through the protocol run, while also offering the possibility to begin the next protoco~ run.
the requirement to incorporate an extra case analysis ofk = 1 and k # 1.
Equations
we might also wish to allow for equations on the message space. Some natural ones would be those describing the relationship between encryption and decryp- The CSP proof rule for recursive definitions allows a proof to proceed which has a structure similar to the proof for the single run given above. The proof rule states that if a recursive definition can be shown to preserve a specification, then the recursively defined process meets that specification. In the case we are considering, we wish to show that tion:
This would remove the need for K 1 and K 2 in the definition of the generates relation, since they reduee under the equality to {m} t-m which is already covered by A l .
There would also be properties such as associativity of concatenation:
Equations could also capture possible properties of encryption mechanisms. For example, encryption distributing over catenation would be quite a significant weakness:
Such equations can be imposed on the message space, but in general their presence might allow additional attacks on protocols. It is useful to understand conditions under which a proof of a protocol's correctness remains valid in the face of such equations.
-.
RUsERA(l) sat maintains I' where RUSERA(l) is USERA (1) restricted on h n s . A . B . p g ( n g , k ) ; each proThe rule states that if, for each 1, under the ussumption that R USERA (I + 1 ) s a t maintains I it is possible to show that R U S E R A (~) s a t maintains I , then we may In fact, the only impact the introduction of an equation has on a proof is that it may make the predicate I illmessage space, it is possible that two different ways of constructing the same message m may correspond to contradictory values for I ( m ) . It is necessary to check R U S E R A ( l ) ' s defined in terms Of RUSERA(l+ ' ) * defined. Since I is often defined structurally over the deduce that R U S E R A ( l ) sat maintains I for each that this possibility has not =isen in order for the proof
The assumption that RUSERA(Z + 1) s a t maintains I means that when R U S E R A (~) is analysed, it is only the messages that the lth protocol run itself can introduce which need to be considered; the assumption on RUSERA(Z + 1) means that we already assume that no subsequent runs will violate the requirement.
The analysis of the messages in the lth protocol run is entirely similar to the analysis already carried out on the single run of the protocol presented above, and does not need to be reproduced here. The main difference is to remain valid.
To check that the invariant I is well-defined, it is necessary to check that if ml = ma then I(m1) * I ( m z )
for any equations given. This states that I respects the relevant equations.
Of the three that have been given here, I is easily shown to respect E l and E2. On the other hand it does not respect E3.
In fact, there can be no invariant in the presence of E3: an attempt to construct one led to the discovery of an attack, where n c is a nonce which the intruder can generate. This run establishes the possibility that A takes ng.nC to be B's nonce challenge, and so B's completion of the protocol does not provide authentication that A received B's nonce challenge B .
A + B
Discussion
In this paper we have shown how the theory of CSP might be specialised to provide a theory for reasoning about authentication protocols. The process of verification requires the assumptions about encryption mechanisms and about the capability of a hostile agent to be made explicit. The theory includes a CSP model of the framework containing the protocol; rules for establishing authentication of messages within a single agent; and a general theorem for deducing authentication between agents from their properties with respect to an invariant on messages, together with rules for deriving the required properties.
We find that construction of the invariant predicate forces consideration of the precise reasons why a protocol is expected to work. In this respect, it should reflect the understanding of the protocol designer and make this understanding precise and explicit. Failed attempts to construct an invariant may also provide insight as to why a protocol does not provide authentication. Use of a weak encryption mechanism which allows Ic(ml.77~2) = Ic(ml).k(ma) would not provide authentication, as stated in Section 9, and the difficulty in finding the invariant may lead to the discovery of the attack, as indeed happened here.
The CSP language, in common with other process algebras such as CCS, provides a language suitable for the description of protocols in a natural way. Abadi and Gordon [l] observe that this kind of approach combines a precise and solid foundation for reasoning about protocols together with a clear relationship to implementations.
Another benefit of the process algebra approach is to identify precisely the authentication property required of a protocol. This may be left vague in the original formulation of the protocol, and performing the verification often gives information as to which properties actually hold, as well as pinning down precisely the properties which are provided by the protocol. The vital question as to whether the properties obtained are indeed those required are beyond the scope of the formal analysis itself, and must really be assessed according to the intended use of the protocol. Security properties may be captured as CSP specifications, or alternatively in terms of equivalences between processes, as is done in [l] , where a network built using the protocol is required to be equivalent to a network which describes the effect of a correct operation of the protocol: equivalence means that the protocol must operate correctly: that no context written in the process algebra can distinguish between the actual protocol and its specification.
Comparison with other approaches
The CSP approach put forward by this author in E201 advocated the encapsulation of required properties in terms of the interactions between the protocol agents and their users. The intention is to separate out the required properties from the way of implementing them. Since a property of a system should be described in terms of its possible interactions with its environment, the internal events trans.i and rec.i
should The essential proof strategy will remain that proposed in this paper, but the high-level description of the property will be purely in terms of the interactions between the network and its environment. The proof rules will remain unchanged, though there will be an additional assumption required that messages not meeting the invariant I are not introduced to protocol agents by the environment; this was guaranteed when such agents had no channels apart from trans and Tec.
The approach of including additional 'control' events into a protocol description is appropriate both for abstracting away the details of the protocol description, and also for providing a clearer understanding of what the protocol designer is attempting to achieve. This separation of concerns allows authentication specifications to be formulated independently of the details of amy particular protocol. If T i n j e c t i v e l y a u t h e n t i c a t e s R then it follows immediately that T authenticates R, since if tr 1 R = () then #(tT 1 R) = 0 and so #(tr T) = 0, and thus tr 1 T = ().
The techniques developed in this paper are concerned only with non-injective authentication. Their extension to deal with injectiveness is an area of ongoing research. The resulting language allows protocols to be described in a straightforward way; the treatment of freshness of nonces and keys is more explicitly provided by the process description language itself: encapsulation with the U operator provides a natural and pleasing model of nonce and key generation. Correctness of a protocol is established by showing that it is testing equivalent to a specification process that describes explicitly what the protocol is intended to achieve. In other words, they are indistinguishable in any context. As a result, the enemy does not have to be modelled explicitly. The capabilities of the enemy are precisely those that can be described within the spi calculus language: a context distinguishing between protocol and its specification would describe an attack on the protocol, and conversely if no context distinguishes them, then the protocol implements the specification in the context of any enemy which may be described in the spi calculus. This contrasts with the approach taken in this paper, where the specification is separated to some extent from the protocol, and which allows finer distinctions to be drawn between different notions of authentication. The explicit description of the enemy allows analysis with regard to different enemy capabilities within the same framework. More comparative examples are required to explore the relative merits of each approach.
The approach of providing an invariant I as the core of a proof is complementary to the tools based approaches [9, 13, 8, 181 which search for attacks. The results of the latter kind of analysis provides useful information as to why a protocol is not correct, or alternatively gives a bald statement that no attack can be found. This is appropriate for debugging, but does not provide understanding as to why a protocol is correct. It is a claim of this paper that the invariant provides the basis for such an understanding, and it might be profitable to explore the interplay between the state exploration approaches and proofs. One problem concerns the relationship between the finite nature of the state space and the infinite possibilities for attacks (such as arise from such aspects as the possibility of arbitrary depths of encryption and combining of messages), and Lowe [lo] has begun to consider a proof strategy based on the general form of a protocol run for establishing when the absence of an attack on a finite state space really does imply that no attack is possible on the infinite state space. It seems that the invariant approach might also be useful in this context.
Paulson [17] has investigated the application of the proof tool Isabelle/HOL to proving security properties of protocols. He specifies security protocols in terms of traces of the system as a whole. The rounds of a protocol are translated into rules about how system traces may be augmented. Possible enemy activities also become rules. Once all of the rules have been identified, the aim is to prove that any system trace that can be generated using the rules must meet the required property; this is established by induction. He does not use an explicit invariant, but he also aims to prove that particular messages can never occur in a trace, and this requires certain lemmas establishing that particular classes of message cannot occur. This is also a feature of the approach taken in [12], which applies language theory to establish that particular terms cannot be generated using given production rules. Mechanical assistance for proofs is invaluable, and Paulson has some useful results concerning reusability of proof strategies. It appears that a number of protocols have proofs of a similar shape, which allows eficient analysis of new protocols. Recent work on providing mechanical assistance to the CSP proofs using PVS [16] is encouraging, but at present' it is still necessary to provide the invariant in order for the proof to proceed, so analysis 'January 1997 of ffesh protocols will not be as automatic as Paulson reports for Isabelle/HOL.
Other approaches to direct proof of protocols, rather than the indirect route by establishing absence of attacks, tend to be based on formal languages for describing security properties, together with rules which support reasoning about statements in the language. Protocols are modelled as rules which allow the derivation of new statements from existing ones. The best known example of such a language is the BAN logic [2], though the need for 'idealisation' of protocols into the logic means that the link between a protocol and its logical treatment is informal. The formal language described in [22] contains lower-level primitives which relate more directly to the steps taken by a protocol, and supports reasoning concerning the knowledge of the intruder at particular stages. This language is used in conjunction with the NRL protocol analyser which is used to check reachability of negated requirements, so it is closer to the tools based approaches. However, an approach to proof reflecting that presented in this paper seems feasible.
Future directions
This paper has presented an approach to analysing and verifying authentication protocols, driven in part by consideration of the Needham-Schroeder protocol. The verification was done by hand, and the cryptographic mechanisms considered are straightforward: nonces, and public-key encryption. There is an obvious need to investigate the CSP handling of other security mechanisms such as timestamps, and to investigate more complicated protocols. Other security properties such as confidentiality should also be investigated. It seems likely that the same approach w i l l apply to confidentiality properties, since such properties may be expressed in terms of unreachability.
Some form of mechanical assistance for proof appears feasible, and this would bring benefits in managing the details of the proofs which can become cumbersome to track. A theory based around the rules given in the paper has now been described in the theorem prover PVS [16] , and investigations are continuing into the assistance that can be provided into finding the invariant.
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